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Econometrica , Vol. 80, No. 2 (March, 2012), 883-903 
CLOCKS AND TREES: ISOMORPHIC DUTCH AUCTIONS AND 
CENTIPEDE GAMES 
By James C. Cox and Duncan James1 
We report an experiment on effects of varying institutional format and dynamic 
structure ofcentipede games and Dutch auctions. Centipede games with aclock format 
unravel, aspredicted by theory but not reported in previous literature on two-player 
tree-format centipede games. Dutch auctions with a tree format produce bids close to 
risk neutral Nash equilibrium bids, unlike previous literature on clock-format Dutch 
auctions. Our data provide a new, expanded set of stylized facts which may provide 
a foundation for unified modeling of play in a class of games that includes centipede 
games and Dutch auctions. 
Keywords: Experiment, game theory, centipede games, Dutch auctions, institu- 
tional format, dynamic structure. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Centipede games and Dutch auctions are two much studied games with a 
dynamic structure in which game theory fails empirically. Each of these games 
has a sequence of binary choices with two properties: (a) one of the choices 
ends the game immediately if chosen by a subject and (b) the payoff a subject 
earns by exercising that choice later in the game is greater than if he exercises 
the choice earlier in the game. In the centipede game, the prediction is that 
the subject with the first move will terminate the game immediately, whereas 
this unraveling prediction is typically not observed in experiments (McKelvey 
and Palfrey (1992, 1998), Zauner (1999)). In the Dutch auction, when the time 
frame for an auction period is comparable to that of a first-price sealed-bid 
auction, subjects allow the auction to continue longer than would be suggested 
by its isomorphism with the sealed-bid auction but shorter than would be con- 
sistent with risk neutral Nash equilibrium (Cox, Roberson, and Smith (1982), 
Turocy, Watson, and Battalio (2007)). In the two strands of the literature, dif- 
ferent explanations for these empirical inconsistencies with theory have been 
proposed. By interchanging features of the two games, we hope to learn more 
about behavioral determinants of empirical regularities that can inform theory 
development for a class of games that contains centipede games and Dutch 
auctions. We focus on the games' institutional format (clock or tree) and dy- 
namic structure (simultaneous or sequential move). 
As in Selten's (1978) analysis of the chain store paradox, we look for game 
form characteristics that affect ". .. visualization of the possible consequences 
'Three anonymous referees and a co-editor provided comments and suggestions that signif- 
icantly improved the paper. Amnon Rapoport provided comments on an earlier version. Fi- 
nancial support was provided by the National Science Foundation (Grants IIS-0630805 and 
SES-0849590). Krawee (Kevin) Ackaramongkolrotn, Darryl McLeod, Erick Rengifo, and Todd 
Swarthout rendered vital aid (repeatedly). 
© 2012 The Econometric Society DOI: 10.3982/ECTA9589 
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of different choices " The tree format provides advance presentation of all 
possible payoffs in a centipede game or Dutch auction, whereas the clock for- 
mat only presents some present payoff information. We ask whether the addi- 
tional information provided by the tree format helps subjects to find strategies 
that increase their payoffs beyond what they attain with the clock format. For 
the Dutch auction, higher earnings with a tree format than with a clock for- 
mat correspond to lower bids that are closer to Nash equilibrium bids. For the 
centipede game, higher earnings with a tree format than with a clock format 
correspond to later take nodes which are further away from the theoretical 
prediction of unraveling to a take at the first opportunity. We do observe these 
effects, and explain how they challenge existing theory for both Dutch auctions 
and centipede games. 
2. RELATED LITERATURE 
2.1. Dutch Auctions 
In his book on the history of auctions, Cassady (1967) discussed types of 
auctions that have been used for long historical periods. He defines "Dutch 
auction" as follows (Cassady (1967, p. 67)): 
In this auction the offer pnce starts at an amount believed to be higher than any bidder is 
willing to pay and is lowered by an auctioneer o a clock device until one of the bidders accepts 
the last offer. The first and only bid is the sales price in the Dutch auction. 
One implication of Cassady's definition is that any bidder who stops the auction 
near the beginning is likely to lose money. This is a defining characteristic of 
Dutch auction that we do not change. 
Vickrey (1961) first explained that the Dutch auction is theoretically iso- 
morphic to the first-price sealed-bid auction in the independent private val- 
ues (IPV) information environment. Cox, Roberson, and Smith (1982), Hirocy, 
Watson, and Battalio (2007), and Katok and Kwasnica (2008) tested this iso- 
morphism by comparing revenue (and bids) in the Dutch and first-price auc- 
tions. Different results for this comparison were found with different Dutch 
auction clock speeds. In contrast, all of these papers report average Dutch 
auction bids greater than expected risk neutral Nash equilibrium (RNNE) bids 
for all Dutch clock speeds. For example, data and statistics reported by Katok 
and Kwasnica (2008, pp. 348, 350) imply that average Dutch auction bids were 
significantly greater than the expected RNNE bid (of 50) for all of their (1, 
10, and 30 second) clock speeds. Dutch auction bids greater than RNNE bids 
have been attributed to risk aversion (Cox, Roberson, and Smith (1982)) and 
impatience (Katok and Kwasnica (2008)). Our paper takes the approach of 
modifying the characteristics of auctions so as to better understand their prop- 
erties. Our modified Dutch auctions differ from previous literature in that we 
focus on variation in institutional format and dynamic structure rather than 
variation in clock speed. Our experiment compares two dynamic institutions in 
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which (clock or tree node) decision opportunity speeds are carefully chosen to 
be the same. We used the middle (10-second) speed used by Katok and Kwas- 
nica, but choice of any conventional clock (and tree node) speed should not 
affect our results. 
2.2. Centipede Games 
The centipede game presents a tension between what economists might sup- 
pose to be an agent's wish to obtain a higher payoff for himself by waiting to 
take and a desire to avoid getting zero (or a low) payoff by waiting so long that 
the other player takes first.2 This tension within an agent, and the potential 
for each agent to develop beliefs about this tension (and other possible mo- 
tivations) in other agents makes the centipede game a potential test bed for 
hypotheses on a range of subjects. 
For instance, does the predicted unraveling outcome (taking at the first 
node) occur in experiments? McKelvey and Palfrey (1992) found that gener- 
ally it did not. What are the implications of failure to play according to the 
theoretical prediction? McKelvey and Palfrey (1992) discussed whether sub- 
jects' altruism could explain the empirical failure of the unraveling prediction. 
McKelvey and Palfrey (1998) examined the explanatory possibilities of a par- 
ticular error-in-choice model, quantal response equilibrium. Zauner (1999) ex- 
amined whether "independent perturbed payoffs" could explain the data (and 
estimated the magnitude of noise in perceived payoffs needed to do so). 
Experiments that vary characteristics of games can be used to assess their 
significance as determinants of behavior. Rapoport, Stein, Parco, and Nicholas 
(2003) found that more players and increased payoffs appeared to increase 
the incidence of unraveling in centipede games. Further work by Murphy, 
Rapoport, and Parco (2006) investigated the effect of moving from n = 3 to 
n = 7 players, and of changing the proportions according to which total pay- 
offs at a node were allocated across the one "winner" and the n - 1 "losers," 
finding a strong effect from increasing n and a milder effect from the change 
in allocation of payoffs. Our paper also takes the approach of varying char- 
acteristics of games so as to better understand their properties. Our modified 
centipede games differ from Rapoport et al. (2003) and Murphy, Rapoport, 
and Parco (2006) in that we focus on variation in institutional format and dy- 
namic structure rather than variations in number of players or absolute and 
relative size of payoffs. Our centipede games differ from McKelvey and Pal- 
frey (1992) in our use of private values, linear growth in total payoffs, and zero 
payoffs for not ending the game. 
2The choice of final node payoffs in our centipede games is determined by the pairing with 
Dutch auctions. If the Dutch auction price clock ticks to zero (or to a positive seller reserve 
price) without any bidder choosing to buy, then all bidders receive zero surplus. Hence the natural 
pairing of centipede games with Dutch auctions i to set all players' payoffs to zero at the final 
node in a centipede game, as in Aumann's (1995) game. 
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2.3. Where Our Paper Fits in the Literature 
To identify the role of institutional format, it is necessary that an exact cor- 
respondence in message spaces across isomorphic games be maintained. This 
design principle, already put forth for the comparison of the Dutch auction 
and the first-price sealed-bid auction by Cox, Roberson, and Smith (1982), is 
similarly applicable to IPV centipede games presented in different institutional 
formats (i.e., clock versus tree). Thus we compare tree format to clock format 
while holding constant dynamic structure (sequential or simultaneous moves), 
payoff increment per discrete unit of time, and number of players. We use a 
10-second tick speed in the clock format that is the same as the speed with 
which the computer advances the active decision node in the tree format if a 
player has not stopped the game by a taking choice. We also compare simulta- 
neous move structure to sequential (or alternating) move structure while hold- 
ing constant institutional format, payoff increment per discrete unit of time, 
and number of players. 
Our paper contributes to the literature by experimenting with the effects of 
changes in institutional format and dynamic structure. If such changes produce 
significant changes in behavior, this would suggest that parameters from mod- 
els such as, say, quantal response equilibrium (McKelvey and Palfrey (1998)) 
or independent perturbed payoffs (Zauner (1999)) would have to vary across 
different representations of the same game, thus leading one to reflect on the 
generality of those models. We look at both Dutch auctions and centipede 
games in the same study because this allows us to ascertain if any dependence 
of bids or takes on format or dynamic structure generalizes across games. Ad- 
ditionally, it should be noted that complete unraveling of the centipede game 
(however operationalized) with only two players and few repetitions would be 
a new type of empirical result. Also, Dutch auction bids consistent with RNNE 
bids would be a new type of result. 
3. EXPERIMENT DESIGN 
3.1. Sequential-Move Dutch and Centipede Clock Games 
The sequential-bid Dutch auction with clock format differs from the tradi- 
tional Dutch auction in one way: bidders alternate price clock ticks at which 
they are allowed to bid. At a given clock reading, only one bidder has the right 
to bid at that clock price; the other bidder(s) have to wait until the clock ticks to 
their turn before they have a chance to bid. In the two bidder, $1.00 price decre- 
ment case in our design, the price on the clock starts at 11 and one bidder can 
bid at clock prices 10, 8, 6, 4, or 2, while the other bidder can bid at clock prices 
9, 7, 5, 3, or 1. The bidders' private values for the auctioned item are indepen- 
dently drawn from the uniform distribution on [1.01, 1.02, . . . , 10.99, 11.00], 
which supports an interior Bayesian-Nash equilibrium (see Section 4.1). This 
version of the Dutch auction is presented to bidders as shown in Figure 1 (for 
the first price tick). 
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Figure 1. - Clock-format sequential-bid Dutch auction. 
The sequential-take IPV centipede game with clock format maintains the 
alternating decision opportunities that characterize the traditional game; in 
the two-player, $1.00 price tick decrement game we utilize in our design, one 
player can take at price clock readings of 10, 8, 6, 4, or 2, while the other player 
can take at price clock readings of 9, 7, 5, 3, or 1. However, instead of hav- 
ing common information about opponents' exact payoffs (as in the traditional 
centipede game), agents know that players' private values are independently 
drawn from the uniform distribution on [11.01, 11.02, . . . , 20.99, 21.00]. This is 
sufficient o support an unraveling prediction (as shown below in Section 4.2). 
This version of the centipede game is presented to subjects in clock format ex- 
actly as the Dutch auction shown in Figure 2 except a player's private value 
(seen in the upper left of the display) would be higher (specifically, it would lie 
between 11.01 and 21.00). 
3.2. Sequential-Move Centipede and Dutch Tree Games 
We use an IPV information environment for our version of the sequential- 
take centipede game in tree format (just as in the clock format). Each player 
has an initial value drawn from a uniform distribution on [0.01, 0.02, . . . , 9.99, 
10.00], to which an amount n is added at each subsequent decision node n = 
1, 2, . . . , 10, which supports an unraveling prediction (as shown in Section 4.2). 
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Figure 2. - Tree-format sequential-move centipede game. 
A player's payoff from taking at node n (when possible) is v¡ + n, where v¡ is 
the player's private value. Each player can only see that the other player has 
some initial value (drawn from a given distribution) to which is added $2.00 
at each of the subsequent other player's decision nodes. The centipede game 
in tree format is presented to the subjects as shown in Figure 2 (with "live" 
decision node indicated by the star at the first node). 
When it is her turn, a subject can choose whether to take (and thus end the 
game) at the current live decision node. If the subject does not choose her take 
option during the 10-second opportunity, the computer advances the live node 
indicator to the next node in the game (which belongs to the other player). 
A player cannot speed up the game by making an active "pass" decision. The 
length of the 10-second live node speed for the tree format corresponds exactly 
to the 10-second clock speed for the clock format. 
The tree format sequential Dutch auction represents the auction with 
an extensive form game tree rather than a price clock. It appears exactly 
as the tree format IPV centipede game pictured in Figure 2, except that 
each bidder has an initial value drawn from the uniform distribution on 
[-9.99, -9.98,..., -0.01, 0.00]. 
3.3. Simultaneous-Move Dutch and Centipede Clock Games 
The simultaneous-bid Dutch auction in clock format is the standard form of 
that auction. The simultaneous-take IPV centipede game in clock format func- 
tions and looks like the format shown in Figure 1 except that the "purchase" 
button is live for both agents at every 10-second tick of the clock. 
3.4. Simultaneous-Move Centipede and Dutch Tree Games 
The simultaneous-bid Dutch auction in tree format differs from the standard 
Dutch auction only in that a tree format is used rather than a clock format. The 
simultaneous-take IPV centipede game with tree format, shown in Figure 3, 
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Figure 3. - Simultaneous-move tre -format games. 
allows each player to take at any node which has been reached; players' payoffs 
are still private information (as denoted by "Initial + 1," etc.). 
3.5. Additional Experimental Design Features 
In addition to design choices intended primarily to hold constant dynamic 
structure across institutional formats, we also made certain design choices to 
minimize the differences in parameterization across treatments. We did this 
so as to minimize potential sources of confounds. First, we used an 11 tick 
clock or 11 node tree with 10-second decision opportunity in every treatment. 
Second, all games utilized an independent private values information environ- 
ment; again, this removes a potential confounding difference for interpreting 
results across games. Third, all games utilized a uniform distribution with a 
support width of $10.00 as the source of independent private values; again, this 
standardization removes an impediment to comparisons across games. Fourth, 
subjects were randomly matched in pairs, each round. Finally, it should be 
pointed out that when all of these design choices were implemented, it left a 
design where all it took to switch between the sequential Dutch auction and the 
IPV centipede game was a $10.00 shift in the location (low value, high value, or 
midrange) of the $10.00-wide support of the uniform distribution used to gen- 
erate independent private values. The eight treatments in the 2x2x2 design 
of the experiment are shown in Figure 4.3 Additional data programs, figures, 
3While Treatment 8 is exactly the traditional Dutch auction, in arriving at the design summa- 
rized in Figure 4 there are necessarily several parameterization differences introduced between 
the centipede game addressed in McKelvey and Palfrey (1992) and the closest thing to it in Fig- 
ure 4, which is Treatment 1. Those parameterization differences include geometric versus linear 
growth of the sum of payoffs, nonzero payoff versus zero payoff for the player who does not 
stop first, and terminal payoffs of zero if the final node is reached. Also, it is worth repeating 
that he information environment used is IPV, so this necessarily both deletes and adds informa- 
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Value Support 
Centipede Dutch auction 
Tree 3 
Institutional 1 3 / 
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 8 
Clock л 
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2 4 
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Dynamic Structure 
Figure 4. - Experiment design (design variables on axes; treatment umbers incells). 
and instructions to experimental subjects are supplied in the Supplementary 
Material (Cox and James (2012)). 
The experiment design thus allows one to detect inconsistencies with theo- 
retical predictions for a given (Dutch auction or centipede) game in a given for- 
mat, differences between results generated using the clock and the tree formats 
for a given game, and differences in deviations from theoretical predictions be- 
tween the sequential-move and simultaneous-move structures of a game. 
If there is a difference in the distributions of bids for Treatment 3 (T3) and 
Treatment 4 (T4), then the isomorphism across institutional formats of the 
sequential-bid Dutch auction fails; if there is a difference in the distributions of 
takes between Treatment 1 (Tl) and Treatment 2 (T2), then the isomorphism 
across institutional formats of the sequential-take IPV centipede game fails; 
and so on throughout the experimental design cube. In general, we would like 
to determine whether either the clock format or the tree format leads to earlier 
or later bids or takes across games, such that this aspect of the results would 
appear to be driven by institutional format rather than characteristics of the 
games captured by existing theory.4 
tion relative to the common information case; that is, by presenting the opponent's payoff (were 
they to take) as "Initial value + 1.00," Initial Value + 2.00," and so on, a component of the 
opponent's payoff is suppressed ( eleting information), but the change in the opponent's payoff 
over time is made more explicit by disaggregation (adding, or at least emphasizing, information). 
That there are (unavoidable) differences in parameterization between the game studied here and 
that in McKelvey and Palfrey (1992) should be kept in mind; further exploration of alternative 
parameterizations is a promising avenue for future empirical work. 
4Additional details of our design are as follows. Each experiment session took approximately 
2 hours. In each session, we ran subjects through three treatments with 10 rounds in each treat- 
ment. After eading instructions for any one of the treatments, subjects participated in three 
practice rounds with ypothetical p yoffs and were given opportunities to ask questions to pro- 
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4. THEORETICAL PREDICTIONS 
For the two games in each pair to be isomorphic, they need to have the same 
dynamic structure. We accomplished this by allowing subjects 10 seconds at a 
given price clock reading or decision node in the tree to click with a mouse to 
bid or to take. If, at the end of 10 seconds, the subject has not bid or taken, 
the game advances to the next price clock reading or decision node in the tree; 
the subject could not actively select "not to bid" or "not to take." The change 
in payoff from one decision opportunity to the next one was set equal to $1.00 
in all games. All games had a default setting of zero payoffs for both players 
in the event of "no bid" in the auction or "no take" in the centipede game. 
We did this because we needed the same end-of-game payoffs across games to 
preserve isomorphism and because the default of "no transaction" is natural 
for Dutch auctions.5 
4. 1 . Predictions for the Sequential-Bid Dutch Auction 
In our sequential Dutch auction with clock format, the odd-price bid- 
der can bid at clock prices of 9, 7, 5, 3, and 1. The even-price bidder can 
bid at clock prices of 10, 8, 6, 4, and 2. The two bidders' values for the 
auctioned item are independently drawn from the uniform distribution on 
[1.01, 1.02, . . . , 10.99, 11.00]. Values and bids are discrete, hence the bid func- 
tions are step functions. The risk neutral Bayesian-Nash equilibrium bid func- 
tions for odd-price bidder and even-price bidder are as follows. Let h{' 
denote that values in the range [ l{ , h{' support an equilibrium bid of b{ by the 
odd-price bidder (j = о ) or the even-price bidder (j = e). No values support 
bids of 9 or 7 by the odd-price bidder or bids of 10 or 8 by the even-price bidder. 
mote understanding of the treatment format. No subject participated in more than one session. 
The paired treatment sequences of the form A-B-A and B-A-B provide controls for learning and 
other possible sequencing effects. The first, second, and third sets of 10 rounds are referred to, 
respectively, as parts 1, 2, and 3. We used the following sequences of treatments in parts 1, 2, 
and 3: T1-T2-T1, T2-T1-T2, T2-T3-T2, T3-T2-T3, T3-T4-T3, T4-T3-T4, T1-T4-T1, and T4-T1-T4; 
T5-T6-T5, T6-T5-T6, T6-T7-T6, T7-T6-T7, T7-T8-T7, T8-T7-T8, T5-T8-T5, and T8-T5-T8. For ex- 
ample, the first listed treatment sequence consisted of 10 rounds of T1 in part 1, followed by 10 
rounds of T2 in part 2, followed by 10 rounds of T1 in part 3. We used an integer clock price 
decrement and node payment increment in all treatments to facilitate quick recognition of payoff 
information by subjects. We used a 2 to 1 experimental dollar to U.S. dollar exchange rate; this 
was needed to keep payments affordable if we were going to keep using a $10.00-wide uniform 
distribution forvalue draws. We did not just shrink all numbers by 50% to keep payoffs affordable 
because we wanted integer payoff changes between decision opportunities, as noted above. 5 Payoffs which deviated from the McKelvey and Palfrey design were used by Fey, McKelvey, 
and Palfrey (1996) and Huck and Jehiel (2004). The latter set the payoff to the loser at 0.10 
pounds regardless of who wins or when (we use 0.00 dollars regardless of who or when); also, they 
started each subject at a different i itial payoff. The latter design is related to ours as follows: if 
one made the accumulation i  payoffs linear and made the initial payoffs private information, it 
would in effect be what is utilized here. 
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The other parts of the equilibrium bid functions are 
odd-price bidder: 5[7.25, 11.00], 3[3.59, 7.24], 1[1.01, 3.58]; 
even-price bidder: 6[9.32, 11.00], 4[5.41, 9.31], 2[2.00, 5.40]. 
The bid functions were first solved numerically; straightforward calculation 
verifies that they satisfy the best reply property. The tree format is strategically 
equivalent. 
4.2. Predictions for the Sequential-Take IPV Centipede Game 
The theoretical prediction for the tree format centipede game with sequen- 
tial-take opportunities and independent private values is unraveling to a take at 
the first opportunity. Let the two players have any two values Vi and v2 drawn 
from the support [0.01, 0.02, . . . , 9.99, 10.00] for the uniform distribution of 
values. This creates a situation where the first mover could earn vi + 1 at take 
nodes t = 1, 3, . . . , 9, while the second mover could earn v2 + т at take nodes 
т = 2, 4, . . . , 10. The player who does not take earns zero at all nodes. If neither 
player has taken by the time the second player's final take node has timed 
out (after 10 seconds), both players earn zero. This suggests that if the second 
player's final take node were to be reached, the second player would take and 
would earn v2 + 10, while the first player would receive zero. A rational first 
player would anticipate this and take at the preceding node, but a rational 
second player would anticipate this and take at the preceding node, and so on. 
The theoretical prediction for the IPV centipede game is unraveling to a take 
at the first node. The clock format is strategically equivalent. 
4.3. Predictions for the Simultaneous-Bid Dutch Auction 
The risk neutral bid function for the simultaneous-bid Dutch auction with 
clock format and values drawn from a uniform distribution on [1.01, 1.02, . . . , 
10.99, 11.00] and with each player able to bid at 10, 9, 8, 7, 6, 5, 4, 3, 2, or 1 are 
as follows. Let bs[ls, hs] denote that values in the range [ls, hs] support a bid at 
price bs on the Dutch price clock. No values support bids of 10, 9, 8, 7, or 6. 
The other parts of the of the Bayesian-Nash equilibrium bid function are 
both bidders: 5[7.67, 11.00], 4[6.46, 7.66], 3[4.16, 6.45], 
2[2.47, 4.15], 1[1.01, 2.46]. 
The bid function was solved numerically with equations embodying conditions 
1-4 in Chwe (1989). Chwe's conditions characterize the pure strategy Nash 
equilibrium bid function in a first-price auction with a discrete bid space. Our 
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numerical solution satisfies the inequalities in Chwe's Proposition 1. The iso- 
morphism between the first-price and Dutch auctions is invoked to apply that 
solution here.6 The tree format is strategically equivalent. 
4.4. Predictions for the Simultaneous-Take IPV Centipede Game 
Let the two players have any two values Vi and v2 drawn from the support 
[0.01, 0.02, . . . , 9.99, 10.00] for the uniform distribution. This creates a situa- 
tion where player a would earn va + 1 if she takes at node t = 1, 2, . . . , 10, while 
player b would earn vb + t if he takes at node t. The player who does not take 
earns zero. If both players try to take at the same node, the probability that 
either succeeds in taking is 1/2. If neither player has taken by the time the final 
take node has timed out, both players earn zero. Therefore, if node 10 were to 
be reached, both players would want to take at that node and the probability 
that either would succeed would be 1/2. A rational player would anticipate this 
and consider the expected payoff from taking at node 9. If player к does not 
try to take at round 9, then player j prefers to take because she would succeed 
with probability 1 and receive payoff v¡ + 9, which is greater than the expected 
payoff from waiting until node 10, which is 1/2 x (v¡ + 10). If player к does 
try to take at round 9, then player j prefers to take because she would succeed 
with probability 1 /2 and receive expected payoff 1/2 x {v¡ + 9), which is greater 
than the zero amount that would be received from not trying to take at round 9. 
Therefore, each player prefers to take rather than pass at round 9. Similar rea- 
soning shows that each player prefers to take rather than pass at round 8, and 
so on back to round 1. The clock format is strategically equivalent. 
5. RESULTS 
Experiment sessions were run in the laboratory of the Experimental Eco- 
nomics Center (ExCEN) at Georgia State University. 544 subjects took part 
in the experiment (and 43 others participated in a pilot or were recruited as 
alternates). 414 subjects participated in at least one 10-round sequence of 
Dutch auctions; 362 participated in at least one 10-round sequence of cen- 
tipede games; 232 participated in simultaneous-move treatments; and 312 par- 
ticipated in sequential-move treatments. 
5.1. Method of Data Analysis 
The statistical results are generated by panel data regressions. The depen- 
dent variable is deviation from the applicable theoretical prediction. The in- 
6Chwe (1989) demonstrated uniqueness of the pure strategy Bayesian-Nash equilibrium bid 
function for the discrete simultaneous-bid auction. Similar arguments to his can be used to es- 
tablish uniqueness of the pair of (odd-price and even-price) pure strategy bid functions for the 
discrete sequential-bid auction as well. 
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TABLE I 
Data Analysis for Dutch Auctions3 
Sequencing-Based Random Effects (and 
Treatment Structurally Based 
Dummies Only Subject Fixed Effects Treatment Dummies) 
Variable Coeff. p-Value Coeff. p-Value Coeff. p-Value 
Constant/Tïee-Cent.-Tïee 0.0777 0.403 0.6913 0.000 0.0703 0.544 
Clock 0.5373 0.000 0.5855 0.000 0.5760 0.000 
Time (0 0.0136 0.005 0.0117 0.007 0.0123 0.005 
Simult. 0.3617 0.000 - - 0.3385 0.000 
Clock-TVee-Clock 0.4653 0.000 - - 0.4489 0.002 
Ttee-Clock-Itee 0.1854 0.099 - - 0.2165 0.118 
Clock-Cent.-Clock 0.1312 0.332 - - 0.1141 0.478 
Cent. -Clock-Cent. 2.0428 0.000 - - 2.3261 0.000 
Cent.-TVee-Cent. 1.4114 0.000 - - 1.6361 0.000 
Clock-Ttee-Clock * t -0.0270 0.000 -0.0254 0.000 -0.0260 0.000 
TVee-Clock-ltee * t -0.0257 0.000 -0.0262 0.000 -0.0263 0.000 
Clock-Cent.-Clock * t -0.0056 0.400 -0.0061 0.313 -0.0061 0.312 
Cent.-Clock-Cent. * t -0.1292 0.000 -0.1580 0.000 -0.1471 0.000 
Cent.-IVee-Cent. * t -0.0863 0.000 -0.1090 0.000 -0.0993 0.000 
R2 0.0967 0.3761 0.0738 
aN = 4475 in all cases (5 missing observations due to network congestion within the experiment). 
dependent variables are binary treatment variables (clock or tree, simultane- 
ous or sequential), time, treatment sequence intercept dummies (thus the con- 
stant in each regression is actually the average deviation from equilibrium for 
that treatment sequence held back from receiving its own intercept dummy), 
and treatment-sequence "slope" dummies (thus the estimate for time coeffi- 
cient is actually for the holdout treatment sequence). Fitted values for a given 
round and treatment sequence are obtainable from estimated coefficients (and 
the round number) according to fitted value = constant + institutional for- 
mat + dynamic structure + sequence intercept + (time coef. + sequence slope 
coef.) * round number. 
5.2. Dutch Auction Results 
Table I shows results from an econometric analysis of Dutch auction data. 
The dependent variable is actual bid less RNNE bid (given in Section 4). The 
data show a dramatic difference in behavior across isomorphic versions of 
the sequential Dutch auction employing different institutional formats and dy- 
namic structures. Various forms of econometric specification lead to the same 
conclusions: deviations from predicted bids are greater in the clock format 
than in the tree format; deviations are greater in the simultaneous structure 
than in the sequential structure; where bidding changes over time, it moves 
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Figure 5. - Bid deviations inDutch auctions. 
almost exclusively in the direction of the predicted bid functions. The struc- 
tural dummies reflect the sequencing detailed in footnote 4; the data from 
similar sequences (e.g., clock-tree-clock) across sequential and simultaneous 
versions are addressed by the same structural dummy for reasons of simplic- 
ity and space; regressions employing different structural dummies across oth- 
erwise similar sequential and simultaneous treatment sequences yield similar 
results. The interaction terms (e.g., Clock-TVee-Clock * t), when summed with 
the time coefficient, capture change in behavior over time for a given treatment 
sequencing. Bold type in a table denotes treatment data used in estimation re- 
ported in that table while nonbold type denotes an intervening treatment with 
data used in estimation reported in the other table. 
The various estimation procedures return almost identical estimates. The 
one exception would initially appears to be subject fixed effects, but even that 
is really telling us the same thing. The seeming difference is due to the inability 
to estimate subject fixed effects in the presence of sequence dummies and the 
"simultaneous or sequential" treatment dummy (because the treatments used 
different subjects). Since these variables must be dropped to run that estima- 
tion, their impact shows up through the fixed effects. 
Figure 5 shows a time series plot of the average deviation from the theoreti- 
cal prediction in each round. It shows how the results differ across treatments 
and where they lie relative to the theoretical prediction in each round. The 
bid deviations from RNNE are not significantly different from zero for some 
sessions and most rounds in the sequential tree format (indeed 952 out of the 
1425 winning bids are at or below the risk neutral prediction). This level of 
elimination of overbidding the RNNE is unprecedented for Dutch auctions 
(with any clock speed). It should be noted that - due to space and visual clarity 
constraints - rounds 11-20 in these figures mix subject groups who had already 
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TABLE II 
Data Analysis for Centipede Games3 
Sequencing-Based Random Effects (and 
Treatment Structurally Based 
Dummies Only Subject Fixed Effects Treatment Dummies) 
Variable Coeff. p-Value Coeff. /?-Value Coeff. p-Value 
Constant/Clock-D.A.-Clock 0.757 0.000 1.162 0.000 0.772 0.000 
Clock -0.396 0.000 -0.413 0.000 -0.408 0.000 
Time (t) -0.008 0.002 -0.009 0.000 -0.009 0.001 
Simuli. -0.213 0.000 - - -0.204 0.000 
Clock-Ttee-Clock -0.170 0.015 - - -0.182 0.023 
Ttee-Clock-Ttee 0.891 0.000 - - 0.918 0.000 
Ttee-D.A.-TYee 0.670 0.000 - - 0.703 0.000 
D.A.-Clock-D.A. 0.444 0.056 - - 0.434 0.057 
D.A.-TVee-D.A. 1.870 0.000 - - 1.859 0.000 
Clock-Itee-Clock * t 0.001 0.616 0.002 0.513 0.002 0.541 
Itee-Clock-TVee * t -0.048 0.000 -0.049 0.000 -0.049 0.000 
IVee-D.A.-ltee * t -0.039 0.000 -0.033 0.000 -0.034 0.000 
D.A.-Clock-D.A. * t -0.027 0.065 -0.025 -0.088 -0.026 0.060 
D.A.-Ttee-D.A. * t -0.105 0.000 -0.104 0.000 -0.104 0.000 
R 2 0.298 0.439 0.278 
аЛГ =3680 in all cases. 
been in the Dutch auction in rounds 1-10 with subject groups who had spent 
rounds 1-10 in the centipede game; the regressions control for this difference 
in sequencing; notably, tree sessions preceded by centipede sessions bid un- 
usually high initially, but drop rapidly toward the prediction. 
5.3. Centipede Results 
Table II shows results from an econometric analysis of centipede game data. 
The dependent variable is actual take node less predicted take node (that is, 
node 1). The analysis uses an approach to treatment sequencing dummies sim- 
ilar to that in Section 5.2, and is as follows. As with the Dutch auction, we find 
that takes/bids are earlier using the clock format and earlier using simultane- 
ous structure, and that, over time, behavior moves in the direction of equilib- 
rium (the latter in a far more pronounced manner than in the Dutch auction). 
Figure 6 plots the time series of the average deviation in take from the theo- 
retical prediction for each institutional format. Note at the outset that moving 
to an IPV environment does not in itself eliminate the failure to unravel typi- 
cal when using the tree format and common information (for n = 2). Clearly, 
knowing the other player's exact payoff information is not necessary for gen- 
erating failure to unravel; this can be seen in the early round results for the 
tree-format sequential centipede game shown in Figure 6. 
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Figure 6. - Take deviations incentipede games. 
The clock-format centipede games show very distinctive results. Indeed, 
from round 4 onward the clock-format simultaneous-take centipede game ex- 
hibits perfect unraveling in 25 of 27 rounds by every pair of subjects across all 
experiment sessions. This prevalence of unraveling is unprecedented for two- 
player centipede games. 
To this point we have oriented graphs and presented data in a manner sug- 
gested by traditional treatment of Dutch auctions and centipede games. We 
now present a graph, Figure 7, of a representative round of data (the first round 
results from the sequential structure games) where all auctions and games are 
ordered by a common axis: ticks elapsed at the time play was terminated. The 
graph is suggestive of the notion that behavior across these heretofore sepa- 
Figure 7. - First round play in sequential structure games viewed on a common axis. 
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rately analyzed games might actually be understood on a common basis: clocks 
support earlier exits and trees support later exits. We explore this notion in the 
next section. 
6. IMPLICATIONS FOR MODELING PLAY IN THE GAMES 
We get some striking results. Winning bids are consistently higher and suc- 
cessful take nodes consistently earlier with the clock format than with the tree 
format for four games. The centipede game unravels much earlier with the 
clock format than the tree format. In the Dutch auction, we can obtain results 
close to the risk neutral Nash equilibrium prediction when we use the tree for- 
mat but not when we use the clock format. Ironically, we get data that more 
closely resemble theoretical predictions for both centipede games and Dutch 
auctions when we use the format that is not traditionally associated with that 
market or game. This implies that previously existing "stylized facts" about be- 
havior in these games - and theory based on those stylized facts - are called 
into question because they ignore the effect of institutional format on behav- 
ior. 
The tree format appears to provide information that subjects use to increase 
their payoffs (relative to clock format) in both Dutch auctions and centipede 
games. With Dutch auctions, the higher payoffs from trees come from lower 
bids that are closer to the RNNE prediction. With centipede games, the higher 
payoffs from trees come from later takes that are further from the unraveling 
prediction. 
The results from these experiments provide a new set of stylized facts, or em- 
pirical regularities, to guide modeling. First, models of behavior should allow 
for an interaction between aspects of institutional design - institutional format 
being of particular interest - and subjects' formulation of strategy. The results 
across different institutional formats for the same game are inconsistent with 
modeling approaches that are insensitive to this. Second, models of behavior 
should allow for at least the possibility of learning; at a minimum, the results 
from the tree-format IPV centipede games are inconsistent with static models.7 
7While a counterargument might be advanced that he more modest change over time in the 
Dutch auction results rules out models that allow for learning, we do not believe that this is 
the way to proceed. Most importantly, the environment i  he Dutch auction experiments, as 
is typical in (IPV) auction experiments, redraws values for each subject, each round; given the 
value support associated with the Dutch auction, this leads to the predicted bids for each subject 
and the predicted winning bids across subjects changing from round to round. In contrast, even 
though the IPV form of the centipede game redraws values similarly, the equilibrium in the IPV 
centipede never moves; it is always a take at the first node. Thus the Dutch auction experiments 
provide a more difficult learning environment i  which subjects would have to learn to hit a mov- 
ing target. In this light, failure of, say, the simultaneous tree-format Dutch auction to converge to 
equilibrium across time to the degree shown in either tree-format IPVcentipede game might be 
understandable. 
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As we think again about how to proceed in future modeling, it is worth revis- 
iting the notion that how subjects perceive and play games and how economists 
model and solve games are not necessarily the same. As a profession we know 
that there is (at least) a layer of modeling that we must be missing; we have 
not advanced so far as to be able to expect all of the results we see from ex- 
perimental work (as shown by the results in this paper and much literature). 
The "missing layer" of subject perception was identified by Selten (1978) in 
the context of the chain store paradox. Specifically, he nominates "... the vi- 
sualization of the possible consequences of different choices ..." as a potential 
key step in strategy selection and, thus, a possible influence on the ultimate 
outcome of the game. This visualization - or construction of a mental model 
of the game - is essential to any subject's subsequent behavior in an economic 
institution. How else are they even to begin to play? 
The informational differences between the institutional formats employed in 
the experiment reported here, and the possible implications for subjects' ap- 
prehension of game structure and formulation of strategy are stark. The tree 
format visually displays at all times to the subject everything they need to know 
about every aspect of an institution: message space, allocation rules, cost rules, 
and adjustment process rules, in their entirety, throughout the length of the 
game. (Alternatively, the same point can be made in terms of strategy spaces, 
payoff functions, and so on.) Representations of all of these could be extracted 
and named by an economist/game theorist examining the game tree; an un- 
trained subject might not be able to name any of them, but would not need to 
do so to be informed by them. The clock format provides none of these, except 
at whatever happens to be the present tick. This would make no difference 
to our economist/game theorist (as they would be able to formulate strategy ex 
ante from a description of the game), but might prove crippling to an untrained 
subject, who would then not only have to try to derive an optimal approach to 
play over the course of the game, but also first have to conceptualize abstractly 
what features of the game are important and how they should be characterized 
or represented. 
One possible illustration of the importance of this contrast might be seen in 
the difference in dispersion of bids/takes across the tree and clock formats in 
early rounds. In Figure 7, for both the centipede game and the Dutch auction, 
the clock format produces data plots where almost all observations fall into 
just two bins - a tight, peaked empirical density - while the tree format pro- 
duces much more spread out plots, with four or five bins receiving substantial 
shares of the observations. Keeping in mind that Figure 7 represents the first 
round of play, before any learning from experience can occur, these plots are 
as close as we can get to observing play based solely on subjects' homegrown 
apprehension of game structure. What the plots suggest is that subjects in the 
clock format seem myopic: they simply are not trying out much of the usable 
strategy space. (Note also that this is in addition to the already noted fact that 
in the clock format the subjects stop closer to the beginning of the temporally 
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ordered strategy space.) Given standard theoretical predictions, the data so 
produced would map to overbidding in the Dutch auction, but to near equi- 
librium play in the centipede game; in each case, however, we might be seeing 
the consequences of myopic subjects where such myopia is largely a function 
of the institutional format employed.8 Conversely, the first round tree-format 
data, which are suggestive of less myopia and more willingness to experiment 
with strategy selection - possibly due to a greater appreciation of the extent 
of the strategy space - are neither uniformly on-target nor off target from the 
standpoint of theoretical predictions. The Dutch auction data are centered on 
the equilibrium prediction, but the centipede data are (as typically) too far into 
the interior of the tree (though the subjects are at and above the theoretical 
profit predictions, respectively). 
In later rounds, learning from past play potentially starts to play a role. The 
drawing power of the traditional equilibria does show, in the data analysis re- 
ported in Tables I and II, in the shrinking over time of deviations from equi- 
librium that is implied by negative values for the "sum of time coefficient plus 
treatment-sequence time interaction coefficient" (4 of 6 such sums are neg- 
ative for the Dutch auction; 6 of 6 such sums are negative for the centipede 
game). If an equilibrium conflicts with the subjects' default desire to play fur- 
ther down the tree than the equilibrium predicts, then as the experiment con- 
tinues, the properties of the equilibrium can eventually win out; in the tree- 
format centipede game, the subjects cannot maintain the initial late takes, in- 
stead gradually unraveling to the equilibrium at the first node. Conversely, if an 
equilibrium does not conflict with bids/takes well into the interior of the strat- 
egy space, the subjects might happily roost there indefinitely - provided they 
can find it in the first place; subjects facing the sequential tree Dutch auction 
seem to be able to do something like this. In contrast, the paucity of infor- 
mation in the clock format encourages subjects to take early regardless and 
counter to their own interest. The subjects facing the clock format "achieve" 
the dubious distinction of quickly attaining equilibrium in the centipede game 
in part because they start out almost at it; the subjects in the clock format miss 
the interior equilibrium in the simultaneous Dutch auction by a huge margin, 
even though they would be better off at it instead, but denied explicit forward- 
looking information (by the clock format), they are unable to find it.9 
8Naïve, myopic behavior with a clock would lead to rapid convergence to predicted dominant 
strategy bidding in IPV single unit English auctions. In this case, all a bidder needs to notice 
to conform totheory is that possible arnings are maximized by remaining in the auction while 
known item value exceeds clock price at the present tick and exiting as soon as this fails to be true. 
Behavior consistent with this was observed by Harstad (2000) in English clock auction experiment 
results. In contrast, there is widespread and persistent bidding above value in the (theoretically 
isomorphic) second-price sealed-bid auction Harstad (2000) in which bidders have to "figure it 
out" that bids equal to value are the dominant strategy. 
'Simultaneous versus sequential structure plays a part in the results too. Specifically, when si- 
multaneous structure is present, subjects' bids (and deviations above predictions) are higher. This 
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The challenge now is to find a model that is capable of encompassing all 
of this. There are some leads with respect to how this might be approached. 
For example, given that we would now desire a model of choice that incorpo- 
rates gradations in the apprehension of strategic alternatives and the possibil- 
ity of evolution of strategy in response to past observations, a modified form 
of experience-weighted attraction (EWA) (Camerer and Ho (1999)) might be 
a possible starting point. For instance, what if EWA could be augmented with 
(a) construction of a mapping between institutional features (among them in- 
stitutional format) and the 5 parameter (governing visualization of payoffs to 
strategies other than those previously chosen by the agent), and (b) construc- 
tion of a mapping between institutional features and initial attractions (the 
initial conditions for the raw material for the probability mass accorded a par- 
ticular strategy)? We already know, from the simulation results of James and 
Reagle (2009) for EWA agents in the first-price sealed-bid auction, that S «s 0 
and (p ъ 1 yields persistent overbidding in the first-price sealed-bid auction 
(over the 500-round horizon used), while with 5 = 1 and <p = 1, EWA agents 
more rapidly converge to expected value maximizing behavior.10 Given that 
5 = 0 corresponds to myopia about payoffs to alternative strategies, while 5 = 1 
corresponds to being fully informed about them, it is tempting to try to map 
the tree format to a high value of 5 and map the clock format to a low value of 
5; certainly the clear differences in informational content between the two in- 
stitutional formats suggest that 5 should differ across institutional formats and 
do so for reasons other than convenience in explaining the particular results in 
this paper. A similar exercise to seed the initial attractions (to various strate- 
gies) might be justified along the same lines and would close the EWA model 
in this application. This is not our only suggestion, however. Analogy-based 
expectation equilibrium (Jehiel (2005)) might be a better candidate to explain 
at least some aspects of our results; in particular, the earlier takes/higher bids 
seen with simultaneous rather than sequential structure seem to be a natural 
outcome for agents using that reasoning system, with coarse information parti- 
tions over past play. In our design, recall of past play would be endogenous and 
is supported as a separate marginal effect in our statistical analysis. Thus when both simultaneous 
structure and clock format re present, the two different effects work in the same direction a d 
(over)bidding is extremely high. When neither ispresent, the risk neutral prediction is attained 
in most rounds. When one is present and the other is absent, we get intermediate results, but our 
design and our statistical analysis allow for the parsing of this. On an intuitive level, what may 
be going on in the simultaneous version isthat he possibility that another bidder might win the 
game while one is looking at the screen, considering alternatives, at least partially counteracts the 
ability of the tree format to promote later bids/takes. 
10In EWA, <p controls the subjects' recall of past round information (1 = perfect recall, 0= 
no memory). A role for <p is not addressed in our conjectures, as our design did not present 
information on previous rounds. The only way something like <p could have had an impact would 
have been if different formats are better or worse at promoting the subjects' own formation f
memory; this is not to say this could not have happened and it is something worth a look in future 
research. 
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dependent on subjects' memories of their own play. Exploration of the impact 
of exogenously varied provision of information on past play in these games is 
an interesting topic for future research, and one that could help further estab- 
lish the suitability of candidate explanatory models. 
We believe that the results in this paper provide new insights into proper- 
ties of alternative institutional formats that should stimulate new theory de- 
velopment for a class of games that includes centipede games and Dutch auc- 
tions. Previously, anomalous results in markets or games have been addressed 
by recourse to either of two types of explanation: newer, more complicated 
models of subjects' choices or an invocation of the broad notion that "insti- 
tutions matter." In contrast, we wish to put forth the notion that the interac- 
tion between specific aspects of subjects' information processing abilities and 
particular features of alternative institutional formats might be driving em- 
pirical results. Specifically, varying the manner in which a market or game is 
displayed (its format) might directly interact with subjects' abilities of visual- 
ization/apprehension of strategic possibilities. (Similarly, varying the provision 
of information on past outcomes might directly interact with subjects' abilities 
of recall.) This represents an advance toward understanding how and why in- 
stitutions matter, as opposed merely to pointing out that they do. In addition, 
it is worth emphasizing that prior to the results in this paper, researchers had 
no reason not to take for granted that there was only one way to format and 
structure a Dutch auction or centipede game, and that said "unique" approach 
was in no way misleading about possible behavior in the game. The experiment 
reported here generates new stylized facts - that for the first time include sig- 
nificant observations of both unraveling in two person centipede games and 
risk neutral bidding in Dutch auctions - which may provide a foundation for 
unified modeling of play in a class of games that includes centipede games and 
Dutch auctions. 
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